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Japan and the Liberal Global-Order Project: 
A Time to Stop and Stare 
Dr Luca Siliquini-Cinelli* 
“If Japan poses problems for Western theory,  
then so much the worse for Western theory.”1 
 
“Japan has always been changing, 
but any future alterations will be on Japanese terms.”2 
 
“My dear members of the Congress, please do come and see the new Japan, 
where we have regained our spirit of reform and our sense of speed.”3 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Japan is a fertile field of inquiry for the legal comparatist. 
Officially4 this is due to the double-featured essence of Japan’s modern 
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1 CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS? THE RISE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
25 (NORTON 1999). 
2 BRIAN J. MCVEIGH, NATIONALISMS OF JAPAN: MANAGING AND MYSTIFYING IDENTITY 
265 (Rowman & Littlefield 2004). 
3 Shinzō Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, Address to Joint Meeting of the US Congress 
(Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.c-span.org/video/?325576-2/japanese-prime-minister-shinzo-
abe-addresses-joint-meeting-congress.    
4 Yoshiyuki Noda made explicit reference to the comparative method. YOSHIYUKI NODA, 
INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 5–9 (Anthony H. Angelo ed. trans., U. of Tokyo Press 
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trajectory as expressed by the influence of the Civil law tradition over the 
Japanese legal system and by the Americanization of the country’s 
commercial, socio-economic, and legal educational spheres.5 
Unsurprisingly, a large number of cultural, socio-legal, and socio-political 
studies have appeared over the past years investigating the impact of the 
legislation and regulations brought about by the 1994 electoral reforms 
and 2001 Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council—For a 
Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century (JSRC)6. Many 
studies have also been conducted about the more recent developments of 
Japan’s administrative apparatus and the growing “legal consciousness” of 
the Japanese.7 
However, the legal comparatist’s interest in Japan may also be 
explained by reference to a different and primary reason that itself 
constitutes the spirit of the comparative method since Solon’s laws. 
Comparative law has a particular capacity to delve into the unofficial 
working levels of a norm or legal system. As the multi-disciplinary and 
unconventional research trends of the past twenty years demonstrate, 
comparative law is capable of uncovering what lies beneath the narratives 
and phenomena that inform, shape, and at times, destroys cultures and 
ideologies by defining identities.8 With respect to Japan, comparative law 
might help the interpreter better understand the peculiarities and 
                                                                                                                         
1976) (1966). 
5 Masaki Abe & Luke Nottage, Japanese Law, ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW 462–79 (Jan M Smits ed., Edward Elgar Pub. 2d ed. 2012); Souichirou Kozuka & 
Luke Nottage, Policy and Politics in Contract Law Reform in Japan, THE METHOD AND 
CULTURE OF COMPARATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARK VAN HOECKE, 235 
(Maurice Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds., Hart Pub. 2014). 
6 The Justice Reform Council, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM 
COUNCIL: FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY, (June 12, 
2001), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html. The JSCR was 
established by Law No 68 of 1999 and its 13 members were all approved by the Diet. 
7 See generally LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT (Daniel H. Foote ed., U. of Wash. Press, 
2008); THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: AN ERA OF TRANSITION (Tom Ginsburg & Harry 
N. Scheiber eds., U. of Cal. Press 2012); DIMITRI VANOVERBEKE ET AL., THE CHANGING 
ROLE OF LAW IN JAPAN: EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN CULTURE, SOCIETY AND POLICY MAKING 
(Edward Elgar Pub. 2014); WHO RULES JAPAN? POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN THE 
JAPANESE LEGAL PROCESS (Leon Wolff, Luke Nottage & Kent Anderson eds., Edward 
Elgar Pub. 2015); Frank K. Upham, Japanese Legal Reform in Institutional, Ideological, 
and Comparative Perspective, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 567 (2013).  
8 See generally Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, The Age of ‘Depoliticization’ and 
‘Dejuridification’ and its ‘Logic of Assembling’: An Essay Against the Instrumentalist 
Use of Comparative Law’s Geopolitics, 37 LOY. OF L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 215 
(2015); Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Taking (Legal) Traditions Seriously, or Why Australian 
Contract Law Should Not Be Codified: An Unconventional Inquiry, 34 U. OF 
QUEENSLAND L.J. 99 (2015).  
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contradictions that characterize its people’s attitudes from different 
perspectives of socio-political and legal inquiry.9 
Delving into both these official and unofficial dimensions, this 
paper presents some preliminary reflections on the outcomes of the 
analytical research on Japan’s attitude toward globalized liberalism. In 
particular, the aim is to contribute to the academic debate on the 
Westernization of Japan’s living standards, and its impact on legal values 
(liberty), form of government (democracy), and doctrines (the rule of law) 
in light of the strategy pursued by the liberal global-order project.10  My 
intention is to show that, despite initial appearances, Japan has never been 
part of the liberal global-order project, and continues to reject it.  
Since the end of the Tokugawa era and the 1868 Meiji 
“Renovation,”11 a great deal of scholarship has dealt with Japan’s 
paradigmatic relationship with the Western notion of civilization. In 
particular, this has been done with the aim of deciphering the inner 
features of the country’s “non-Asianness”12. Hence there is the need to 
further clarify: the scope of this contribution, what sets it apart from other 
                                                 
9 Over the last three decades, the public has come to know of Japan’s alleged 
inconsistencies and dilemmas through a great deal of scholarship. For the scope of this 
paper, see generally HERBERT P. BIX, HIROHITO AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 
(Harper Perennial 2001) (2000); IAN BURUMA, INVENTING JAPAN: 1853–1964 (Modern 
Library 2003); GERALD L. CURTIS, THE JAPANESE WAY OF POLITICS (Colum. U. Press 
1988); GERALD L. CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS: LEADERS, INSTITUTIONS, 
AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE (Colum. U. Press 1999); CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND 
THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY: 1925-1975 (Stan. U. 
Press 1982); JEFF KINGSTON, CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE SINCE THE 1980S (John Wiley & Sons 2d ed. 2013); GAVAN MCCORMACK, 
CLIENT STATE: JAPAN IN THE AMERICAN EMBRACE (Verso 2007); GAVAN MCCORMACK, 
THE EMPTINESS OF JAPANESE AFFLUENCE (M.E. Sharpe 1996); R. TAGGART MURPHY, 
JAPAN AND THE SHACKLES OF THE PAST (Oxford U. Press 2014); JACOB B. SCHLESINGER, 
SHADOW SHOGUNS: THE RISE AND FALL OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR POLITICAL MACHINE (Stan. 
U. Press 1999) (1997); KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 
(Vintage, 1990) (1989).  
10 This term refers to the intention to create a world society underpinned by the liberal 
notions of ‘civilized economy’ and ‘good economic governance.’ Both terms relate to the 
belief that governments should educate consumers, as well as build or reform institutions 
and regulate economic activities, according to rational global standards determined by 
outsiders. See generally Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Hayek the Schmittian: Contextualising 
Cristi’s Account of Hayek’s Decisionism in the Age of Global Wealth Inequality 24 
GRIFFITH L. REV. 687 (2015); Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, “Against Interpretation”? On 
Global (Non-)Law, the Breaking-Up of Homo Juridicus, and the Disappearance of the 
Jurist 8 J. OF CIV. L. STUD. 443 (2015). 
11 On why the term ishin should be translated as “renovation” rather than “restoration,” 
see Tetsuo Najita, Conceptual Consciousness in the Meiji Ishin, in MEIJI ISHIN: 
RESTORATION AND REVOLUTION 83–102 (Nagai Michio & Miguel Urrutia eds., U.N. U. 
1985). 
12 MCCORMACK, CLIENT STATE, supra note 9, at 200. 
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comparative accounts, and the unconventional negative terms that I will 
use. 
The visiting scholar experience at Kyushu University is part of a 
broad comparative research program on the bio-political and juridical 
essence of so-called “Abenomics.” The three facets of Prime Minister 
Shinzō Abe’s economic strategy are: (1) aggressive monetary easing to 
weaken the yen, boost the stock market, and generate inflation; (2) fiscal 
spending through budget deficits; and (3) structural change to sustain 
long-term economic growth. 
Abenomics has not had the desired results and some doubt it ever 
will.13 Despite this, Abenomics has received a considerable amount of 
national and international support because it has helped Japan emerge 
from recession.14 At first glance, the plan seems imbued with Keynesian 
(i.e., devaluation and fiscal stimulus) principles and aims to push the 
Westernization of Japan’s socio-economics regulative schemes farther.15 
Abe’s success in liberalizing the electricity and gas sectors, as well as in 
dispatching the labor market along the trajectory initiated by the 1986 
Labour Dispatch Law, and further promoted by Prime Minister Obuchi in 
1999 and Prime Minister Koizumi in 2004, are testament to this.16 
In this sense, Japan’s willingness to enter the liberal global-order 
project could be made in light of the country’s long-sought 
internationalization (kokusaika). In particular, with respect to foreign 
public and private policies and relations, several elements could be 
interpreted as other signals that Japan shares the post-political, socio-
economic managerial paradigm put forward by liberals as the West’s post-
war guardians. These include: (1) the activities of the Asian Development 
Bank, which was established in 1966 and the biggest shareholders being 
Japan and the US; (2) the negotiations with the European Union and the 
signing of the first Free Trade Agreement and Economic Partnership 
Agreement; (3) the signing, in February 2016, of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership with the US and ten other countries that together account for 
over two-fifths of global gross domestic product and whose main purpose 
                                                 
13 See generally Levitation Speed, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 4, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21703379-japan-gets-less-
stimulus-expected-levitation-speed; Overhyped, Underappreciated, THE ECONOMIST (Jul. 
28, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21702751-what-japans-economic-
experiment-can-teach-rest-world-overhyped-underappreciated. 
14 See generally Levitation Speed, supra note 13; Overhyped, Underappreciated, supra 
note 13. 
15 See, for instance, the Keynesian policies put forward by the President of the Bank of 
Japan, Kuroda Haruhiko. See generally Bank of Japan Expands Stimulus, Disappointing 
Investors Fortune (Jul. 29, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/29/bank-of-japan-stimulus-
expand-interest-rates-brexit/.  
16 MCCORMACK, CLIENT STATE, supra note 9, at 41–47. 
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is to contain China’s geopolitical and economic power;17 (4) the fact that 
Abe was the first Japanese Prime Minister to have been invited to speak in 
front of the US Congress;(5) the 2015 update of the guidelines for 
American-Japanese defense cooperation in Asia; and (6) top financial 
operations such as the acquisition of the Financial Times by Nikkei and of 
two Finmeccanica rail businesses by Hitachi. 
Yet upon closer look, several data suggests that, far from being a 
mere economic plan, Abenomics is part of a more comprehensive 
reformative roadmap (kouzou kaikaku) the main purpose of which is to 
restore the national polity (kokutai) that informed the pre-war imperial 
system.18 These include: (1) the enactment, in September 2015, of security 
                                                 
17 In President Barack Obama’s words, “These kinds of agreements make sure that the 
global economy’s rules aren’t written by countries like China; they’re written by the 
United States of America”. See generally Eric Bradner & Deirdre Walsh, Democrats 
Reject Obama on Trade, CNN (June 13, 2015), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/12/politics/white-house-tpp-trade-deal-
congress/index.html; The 70-Year Itch, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 6, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21660552-america-struggles-maintain-its-
credibility-dominant-power-asia-pacific-70-year; A Weighting Game, THE ECONOMIST 
(May 30, 2015), http://www.economist.com/cge15. The recent resignation of Japan’s 
economy minister, Akira Amari, has led some commentators to wonder whether Japan 
will be capable of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership. See generally Negative Rates, 
Positive Polls, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21690108-shinzo-abe-weathers-exit-scandal-hit-
minister-surprising-ease-negative-rates-positive. 
In late September 2016, the Japanese Parliament (Diet) commenced an extraordinary 66-
day-long session, to be concluded in late November, to ratify the TPP. See generally 
Tomohiro Osaki, Abe Goes Toe-to-Toe over TPP as Diet Debate Heats up, JAPAN TIMES, 
(Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/27/national/politics-
diplomacy/abe-goes-toe-toe-tpp-diet-debate-heats/. 
18 Kokutai is an old and broad term that mainly denotes the purity of the Japanese spirit 
(nihon seishin) and of the ethnic form of polity/state that expresses it (minzoku kokka). 
Scholars agree that the kokutai sentiment has both an ideological and practical political 
meaning, the latter of which is expressed by its military component. However, its actual 
content was much debated during the Tokugawa shogunate (1603–1867), especially by 
the representatives of the Nativist School (Kokugaku), such as Fujiwara Seika (1561–
1619), Hayashi Razan (1583–1657), Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), and Hirata Atsutane 
(1776–1843). Aizawa Seishai (1782–1863) also played a fundamental role in the Meiji 
Renovation and will be discussed in due course. In addition to the 1873 censorship 
instruction to the press, the reader may refer to the 1890 Imperial Rescript of Education 
and the 1937 Ministry of Education’s “Cardinal Principles of the National Polity.” 
Kokutai no Hongi. IMPERIAL RESCRIPT ON EDUCATION (Oct. 30, 1890), 
https://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1392009.files/THE%20IMPERIAL%20RESCR
IPT%20ON%20EDUCATION.pdf; ANDREW GORDON, A MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN: 
FROM TOKUGAWA TIME TO THE PRESENT 196 (Oxford U. Press 2014). Significantly, Abe’s 
renovation intent has been recently endorsed by one of Japan’s most powerful nationalist 
organizations, Nippon Kaiji (Japan Council).  Mari Yamaguchi, Ultraconservative Lobby 
Backs Japan PM Charter Change Drive, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jul. 13, 2016), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/4a1d99a94cee42368c203aa76d8a538d/ultraconservative-
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bills (Legislation for Peace and Security and International Peace Support 
Law) aimed at allowing the use of collective self-defense when (i) Japan is 
attacked, or when a close ally is attacked and the result threatens Japan's 
survival and poses a clear danger to people, and (ii) there is no other 
appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival 
and protect its people—the legislation came into effect on 29 March 2016; 
(2) the approval, in December 2016, of the biggest defense budget (5.13 
trillion yen ($43.6 billion) and the appointment, in August 2016, of 
Tomomi Inada as Minister of Defense; (3) the enactment of the Official 
Secrets Act 2013;19 (4) the establishment of the National Security Council 
and of the National Security Strategy in December 2013; (5) the 
subsequent April 2014 enforcement of the Three Principles of Transfer of 
Defense Equipment and Technology; (6) the government’s intention to 
have an electoral reform legislation enacted during the current Diet 
session; (7) the revision of the Official Development Assistance within the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; (8) the 
enactment of the Basic Act on Education (Kyōiku Kihonhō) in 2006;20 (9) 
the Yasukuni visits and unfriendly relations with neighboring countries 
such as South Korea and China;21 and (10) the government’s overall 
                                                                                                                         
lobby-backs-japan-pm-charter-change-drive. 
19 See generally Lawrence Repeta, Japan’s 2013 State Secrecy Act: The Abe 
Administration’s Threat to News Reporting, 12 ASIA-PAC. J. 1 (Mar. 2014), 
http://apjjf.org/-Lawrence-Repeta/4086/article.pdf. 
20 MCCORMACK, CLIENT STATE, supra note 9, at 140–57. 
21 Article 20(3) of the 1947 Constitution states that “The State and its organs shall refrain 
from religious education or any other religious activity.” NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] 
[hereinafter CONSTITUTION], May 3, 1947, art. 20(3) (Japan). From 1983 to 2001, 
Japan’s prime ministers have duly refused any association with the Yasukuni Shrine in 
Tokyo, where Japan’s war dead are enshrined. Former Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi 
visited the shrine annually, notwithstanding the constitutional provision and the “anti-
Yasukuni” sentiment of the US and neighboring countries (with the exception of China’s 
former President Lee Ten-hui who visited the shrine in 2007). This is not causal, as the 
idea at the center of Koizumi’s premiership was that Japan’s socio-economic crisis was 
rooted in a more profound spiritual vacuum. Abe has been promoting the same belief. See 
generally MCCORMACK, CLIENT STATE, supra note 9. Other examples of renewed 
nationalist sentiment are the well-known territorial disputes with China, South Korea, and 
Russia over the Senkaku, Dokdo (Takeshima for the Japanese), and Kuril Islands, and the 
dispute with South Korea over the “right” social studies textbook to be used in Japan’s 
junior high schools.   
In regard to the former issue, Japan, China and South Korea have held a trilateral meeting 
in late August. See generally Kiyoshi Takenaka & Xiao Yu, Japan, China, South Korea to 
urge North Korea to stop provocation, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-trilat-idUSKCN10Z0AW; Sven 
Saaler, Nationalism and History in Contemporary Japan, 14 ASIA-PAC. J. (Oct. 2016), 
http://apjjf.org/2016/20/Saaler.html. While in June 2015, at the 50th anniversary of the 
countries’ diplomatic relationship, Abe and the South Korean President Park Geun-hye 
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public diplomacy, and in particular, its pressure on  the country’s liberal 
broadcasters.22 
Therefore, the economic and political agendas are part of one main 
objective: restoring Japanese authority and prestige. It is commonly held 
that this political intent poses a clear threat to the modernization and 
democratization of Japan (minshuka).23 In particular, when focusing on the 
shift towards the new “authoritarian ‘family state,”24 Murphy has pointed 
out that the reaffirmation of the kokutai entails the dismantling of the 
political decision-making machine that has operated in Japan since the 
premiership of Tanaka Kakuei (1972–74).25 This seems to be confirmed by 
                                                                                                                         
called for a “new era,” it cannot go unnoticed that both South Korea and China expressed 
severe criticism of the nationalistic speech with which Abe marked the 70th anniversary 
of the end of the II World War. See generally Central Park: Diplomatic Logjams in 
North-East Asia Are Breaking at Last, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21676818-diplomatic-logjams-north-east-asia-are-
breaking-last-central-park. On Japan’s attitude towards China and South Korea, see 
Nakano Koichi, Contemporary Political Dynamics of Japanese Nationalism 14 ASIA-
PAC. J. 1 (Oct. 2016), http://apjjf.org/2016/20/Nakano.html.  
With respect to the latter, see generally Tawara Yoshifumi, The Abe Government and the 
2014 Screening of Japanese Junior High School History Textbooks, 13 ASIA-PAC. J. 1 
(Apr. 2015), http://apjjf.org/-Tawara-Yoshifumi/4312/article.pdf.  
 
22 See generally Jeff Kingston, The Japan Lobby and Public Diplomacy, 14 ASIA-PAC. J. 
1 (May 2016), http://apjjf.org/-Jeff-Kingston/4884/article.pdf; Anchors Away, THE 
ECONOMIST (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21693269-criticism-
government-being-airbrushed-out-news-shows-anchors-away; Speak No Evil, THE 
ECONOMIST (May 16, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21651295-japans-
media-are-quailing-under-government-pressure-speak-no-evil. 
23 See generally Statement by Constitutional Scholars in Support of Japanese Students 
and Citizens Protesting Prime Minister Abe’s Reinterpretation of Pacifist Constitution, 
ICONNECT (Jul. 10, 2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/07/statement-by-
constitutional-scholars-in-support-of-japanese-students-and-citizens-protesting-prime-
minister-abes-reinterpretation-of-pacifist-constitution/. 
For a contextualization of Japan’s contemporary nationalist roadmap, see the accounts 
featuring in the Special Issue of the ASIA-PAC. J. (Oct. 2016), 
http://apjjf.org/2016/20/Kingston.html.  
24 MURPHY, supra note 9, at 356. See generally CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES, JAPAN’S 
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY UNDER THE ‘ABE DOCTRINE’ (Palgrave Pivot 2015).  
It should be noted that a similar roadmap was pursued by Abe’s rightist grandfather, 
Nobusuke Kishi. Not coincidentally, Abe began his speech to the US Congress by 
quoting Kishi own address in the same chamber in 1957. Importantly, Kishi was one of 
the closest associates of Tōjō Hideki, the General and Prime Minister who was sentenced 
to death by the International Tribunal for the Far East for the crimes committed during 
the World War II.  
25 MURPHY, supra note 9, at 366. It is well-known that notwithstanding its liberal and 
deregulating-privatizing façade, this was the aim of Koizumi’s nationalist premiership as 
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the efforts that, since its historical defeat in the 1993 elections, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) has dissociated itself from the system of power 
personified by the party’s former secretary-general and Tanaka’s greatest 
pupil, Ozawa Ichirō. 
The LDP’s strategy proved to be necessary for Abe’s nostalgic 
agenda. Indeed, when the need to amend the 1947 Constitution became 
even more evident at the end of the Cold War, Ozawa took the lead of the 
“Creative Reinterpretation” group whose party platform was against 
revision.26 Conversely, Abe has always favored the rewriting of the 
pacifist and US-imposed Charter in light of the newly rediscovered 
nationalist ideology and rearmament plan. Both reforms are part of the 
fukoku kyōhei, or “rich nation and strong army”, vision.27 Not only the 
above-mentioned recent militarist reforms, but also the 2006 passing of 
the Basic Act on Education are fundamental steps along this nationalist 
reformative path. 
                                                                                                                         
well for several different reason—one of them being the fact that Koizumi was the pupil 
of former Finance Ministry bureaucrat Fukuda Takeo, Tanaka’s great rival. Recently, see 
generally MCCORMACK, CLIENT STATE, supra note 9, at 33; MURPHY, supra note 9, at 
304, at 360–61. See also Koichi, Contemporary Political Dynamics of Japanese 
Nationalism, supra note 23. 
26 See MCCORMACK, THE EMPTINESS OF JAPANESE AFFLUENCE, supra note 9, at 203–7.   
27 Abe has recently described the revision of the 1947 Constitution as his ‘duty as LDP 
President.’ See generally Linda Sieg et al., Revising Japan’s Pacifist Charter Not Easy 
Despite Poll Win – PM, REUTERS (Jul. 11, 2016), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-japan-
election-idUKKCN0ZQ016. See also Abe Explicit in Call for Amendment to 
Constitution’s Article 9, The Japan Times (Feb. 3, 2016), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/03/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-explicit-
call-amendment-constitutions-article-9/. But see the opposite statement made by the 
LDP’s Vice-President, Masahiko Kōmura, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/26/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-vice-chief-
negative-revising-article-9/#.WCIc7Hq3TEA. I am grateful to Machiko Hachiya for 
stressing that Abe can push his ideology much farther than Prime Minister Nakasone did 
because of the end of the Cold War, China’s leadership in the region, and Japan’s 
counter-terror strategy. 
The LDP submitted a revised draft in 2012. In May 2015, after more than two years of 
recess, the LDP resumed the meetings of its Constitution revision panel. Cartoon 
pamphlets were then distributed to raise public awareness of and support for the 
initiative. The spark of this sentiment is to be found in the policies initiated in the mid-
1950s by Prime Minister Ichirō Hatoyama, and which received further support from 
former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who, at the age of 96, delivered a speech at 
the 2015 meeting. See generally Mari Yamaguchi, LDP Gears up to Revise Constitution, 
JAPAN TIMES (May 2, 2015), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/02/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-gears-up-
to-revise-pacifist-constitution/.  
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If this is correct, it would not only mean that, as Lawrence Repeta 
has contended, “Japan is facing a constitutional crisis.”28 Instead, it would 
mean that Japan represents a counter-force to the move of Western 
civilization towards the self-annihilating global-order project brought 
about by liberalism’s notion of “civilized economy”. This is why it is 
necessary to embark upon an interdisciplinary comparative analysis of 
Abenomics by contextualizing (1) Japan’s recent socio-political and legal 
development; (2) the re-emergence of the kokutai strategy; and (3) the 
country’s peculiar relationship with the roadmap pursued by the promoters 
of universalized liberalism.  
Before going any farther, it would be appropriate to expound the 
relevance that liberals’ imperialist agenda has for the Japanese form of 
polity in greater detail. Elsewhere, I argued that the substitution of action 
with behavior prompted by the politico-theological and liberal traditions, 
and further normalized by legal positivism, have determined the 
absorption of authority and sovereignty by power, and thus, of government 
with governance.29 The effects of this artifice have become particularly 
noticeable since the fall of the “bipolar” system. The post-political strategy 
pursued by universalized liberalism has indeed voided local government 
through an emphasis on global governance, in so endorsing the 
substitution of politics with administration. Hence, I further maintained, 
Westerners currently “(non-)live” in a sort of post-political “global Eden”, 
that is, in the global aspirational “(non-)dimension” in which what 
constitutes human uniqueness makes no appearance because we do not act 
                                                 
28 See generally Lawrence Repeta, Japan’s Proposed National Security Legislation—Will 
This Be the End of Article 9? 13 ASIA-PAC. J. 1 (June 2015), http://apjjf.org/-Lawrence-
Repeta/4335/article.pdf. Over the past two years, several commentators have denounced 
the unconstitutional essence of the informal constitutional amendment sought the 
Japanese government. Among them, stands Hasebe Yasuo, a towering constitutionalist. 
See generally Hasebe Yasuo Interview with the Kochi Shimbun, ICONNECT (June 30, 
2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/06/hasebe-yasuo-interview-with-the-kochi-
shimbun/. See also Muto Ichiyo, Retaking Japan: The Abe Administration’s Campaign to 
Overturn the Postwar Constitution 14 ASIA-PAC. J. 1 (Jul. 2016), http://apjjf.org/-Muto-
Ichiyo/4917/article.pdf. It should be noted, however, that Abe’s “renovationist” plan 
appears to have been backed up by 49% of the voters in the recent Upper House election. 
For a contextualization of the legislative process that led to the passing of the Legislation 
for Peace and Security and of the public perceptions, see Anne Mette Fisker-Nielsen, Has 
Komeito Abandoned Its Principles? Public Perception of the Party’s Role in Japan’s 
Security Legislation Debate, 14 ASIA-PAC. J. (Oct. 2016), http://apjjf.org/2016/21/Fisker-
Nielsen.html.  
29 See generally Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, On Legal Positivism’s Word and Our ‘Form-of-
(non-) Living’, 16 GLOBAL JURIST 211; Siliquini-Cinelli, Hayek the Schmittian, supra 
note 10; Siliquini-Cinelli, “Against Interpretation”?, supra note 10; Luca Siliquini-
Cinelli, Béatrice Schütte, Conceptualizing the Schmittian ‘Exception’ in the European 
Union: From the ‘Opt-Out’ Procedure(s) to Indirect Forms of Secessionism, 15 
CHICAGO-KENT J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 1 (May 2015). 
10 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal Vol. 18:1 
 
but merely behave according to the reason-oriented mechanisms of 
societal interaction brought about by liberalism.   
This “intangible open”30 is characterized by the liberal model of 
civilization, which is ultimately rooted in the Western (and in particular, 
Anglo-American31) standardization of local and particular forms of 
cultural sensibility. Importantly, in this system of perfect contemplation of 
objective regularities rather than subjective irregularities, of procedural 
rather than absolute truths, of language rather than languages, we do not 
have a sense of our living experience because we neither come to birth nor 
die as “someone”—a consequence of the liberal aim to achieve a perfect 
order from the chaos that affects the condition of the state of nature (homo 
homini lupus). From a genealogical point of view, this totalizing strategy 
finds its origin precisely in the extent to which the modern sterile technē 
oikonomikē has penetrated the domain of the political. The secularization 
of naked or bare life (that is, real “people”, or zoē) and political or public 
existence (that is, ideal “People”, or bios) is a key component of this 
process. 
Bearing in mind Arendt’s studies on the dissolution of the “public-
private” divide, Kolakowski’s inquiry into the self-destructive essence of 
the liberal paradigm of the “open society” and “bureaucratization of the 
world”, and Agamben’s accounts of the “occult” double-sided source of 
Western politics,32 I have defined this contemplative “(non-)reality” as an 
“intangible (non-)dimension”. Indeed, it may not be considered a territory 
in spatio-ontological terms and, consequently, there is no need in it for a 
nomos in terms of “division”, “allocation”, and “appropriation” (Nahme) 
of rights, interests, obligations and duties; that is to say, by being made up 
of “(non-)boundaries”, “global (non-)law” rejects law’s anthropological 
and ontological need for a tangible signature. Importantly, the movement 
towards this sort of Kojèvean post-historical (that is, animal) condition is 
taking place through the formal “de-politicization” and “de-juridification” 
of the world; that is, through the imposition of the administrative and 
economics-oriented paradigm of liberal global governance as opposed to 
that of local government. 
                                                 
30 See generally Siliquini-Cinelli, “Against Interpretation”? supra note 10. 
31 See generally Bradner & Walsh, Democrats Reject Obama on Trade, supra note 17.  
32 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE (Penguin 2006) (1961); 
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (U. of Chi. Press 1998); HANNAH ARENDT, 
ON REVOLUTION (Penguin 2006) (1963). With respect to Agamben, I refer to the 
“politico-juridical rationality” and the “economic-governmental rationality”. See Giorgio 
Agamben, Introductory Note on the Concept of Democracy, DEMOCRACY IN WHAT 
STATE? 1–5 (Colum. U. Press 2012) (2009); see generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE 
KINGDOM AND THE GLORY: FOR A THEOLOGICAL GENEALOGY OF ECONOMY AND 
GOVERNMENT (Lorenzo Chiesa & Matteo Mandarini trans., Stan. U. Press 2011) (2007).  
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Liberalism’s notion of “civilized economy”, and its related belief 
that governments should educate consumers and build or reform 
institutions to regulate economic activities according to rational global 
standards determined by outsiders is what we should delve into when 
trying to offer a neorealist,33 rather than modern or post-modern,34 
contextualization of Japan’s vacillation between its “non-Asianness”35 and 
the Westernization of its living, socio-economic, political, and legal 
standards.36 
A specific reference to Agamben would in this sense be profitable. 
Indeed, as Agamben noted in a short but highly valuable book in which he 
analyzed the “animality of man in post-history,”37 Kojève thought that 
Japanese society had undertaken a diametrically opposed path to that of 
the American form of civilization, thus giving rise to the first and only 
post-historical human condition. Kojève’s revolutionary account explained 
why Japan had not been affected by the totalizing dehumanization of the 
world as brought about by the imposition of the sterile “American way of 
life,” and thus of liberalism’s reason-oriented working logic on societal 
relations. Conversely, nearly fifty years later after Kojève’s account, 
Supiot placed the “civilizing mission” of contract as experienced by Japan 
at the center of his inquiry into the dissolution of the law’s anthropological 
and socio-political regulative function and special domain.38 In other 
                                                 
33 See generally FRANCA D’AGOSTINI, REALISMO? UNA QUESTIONE NON CONTROVERSA 
(Bollati Boringhieri 2013). 
34 See generally David Pollack, Modernism Minceur, or Is Japan Postmodern?,  44 
MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 75 (1989); Postmodernism and Japan, 87 SOUTH ATLANTIC 
QUARTERLY (Masao Miyoshi & H.D. Harootunian eds., 1988). 
35 Tom Ginsburg has recently argued that Japan’s politico-economic high-growth era was 
structurally connected to the transfer that Japan has made of its “configuration of legal 
institutions” to the Northeast Asian region. See Japanese Law and Asian Development, 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA 68–88 (Gerald Paul McAlinn & Caslav Pejovic eds., 
Routledge 2011). 
36 What McCormack has persuasively labelled Japan’s “dependent nationalism” when 
describing the country’s reliance on US foreign policy to protect its uniqueness is a key 
component of this equivocal attitude. See MCCORMACK, CLIENT STATE, supra note 9, at 
81. See also S. N. EISENSTADT, JAPANESE CIVILIZATION: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 15 (U. of 
Chi. Press 1996). This assertiveness should be analyzed through the lens of Maruyama’s 
politico-realist belief that while international behavioral guidance is required for national 
leaders to avoid directing their nation toward ruin, an alliance with the US would 
nevertheless undermine democracy and thus (democratic) nationalism. See FUMIKO 
SASAKI, NATIONALISM, POLITICAL REALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN 131–57 
(Routledge 2012). 
37 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE OPEN: MAN AND ANIMAL 12 (Kevin Attell trans. Stan. U. 
Press 2004) (2002). 
38 ALAIN SUPIOT, HOMO JURIDICUS: ON THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE LAW 
78–86 (Saksia Brown trans. Verso 2007). 
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words, Supiot used the liberal contractarian notion of “civilized economy” 
to argue the exact opposite of what had been contended by Kojève.39 The 
question is, whether Japan constitutes the exception to our current 
animalization as behavioral “form-of-(non-)living,” or is its most 
appropriate and powerful example. 
It is all the more evident that the answer cannot be found by only 
looking at Japan’s normative development. Considering that Japan’s 
political and juridical settings are more the delicate and sophisticated 
result of unwritten customary practices and living methodologies than of 
official and visible rules,40 legal positivism’s political sin41 would affect 
any attempt to overcome the boundaries of official presentations and 
storytelling narratives. 
Yet this poses the difficulty of what roadmap the comparatist 
should pursue when trying to understand the Japanese paradigm. In a 
recent account of Japan’s modernization through legal changes, Lawrence 
M. Friedman correctly contended that “[t]here is . . . no obvious way to 
test the convergence theory.”42 The same may be safely argued with 
respect to the divergence model, as the list of possible criteria which may 
be used to analyze why Japan has not been affected by the universalization 
of liberal thought could be drafted endlessly.43  
                                                 
39 See also Takashi Uchida & Veronica L. Taylor, Japan’s “Era of Contract,” in LAW IN 
JAPAN: A TURNING POINT, supra note 8, at 454–82. See also Hiroo Sono, Integrating 
Consumer Law into the Civil Code: A Japanese Attempt at Re-Codification, CODIFYING 
CONTRACT LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVES 107–29 
(Therese Wilson & Mary Keyes eds., Ashgate 2014). 
40 See generally JAPANESE MODELS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (S. N. Eisenstadt & Eyal 
Ben-Ari eds., K. Paul Int’l. 1990); JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW 
AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX (Oxford U. Press 1991). 
41 See generally Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa: For a (Post-)Schmittian 
Decisionist Theory of Law, Legal Reasoning and Judging 39 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 118 
(2014). 
42 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Japanese Law in the Modern World, THE JAPANESE LEGAL 
SYSTEM: AN ERA OF TRANSITION 11 (Tom Ginsburg & Harry N. Scheiber eds., Robbins 
2012). 
43 A possible criterion could be the peculiar essence and role of Japan’s behavioral 
schemes of societal interactions and their impact on the self-defining power-to-will, 
which should be analyzed in light of the influence that Shintoism still has upon Japanese 
society. This would necessitate addressing the belief in a spiritual entity (kami) that 
generates the world not by deciding “for” and “against” someone and something, as the 
God of St. Augustine and Paul did, but by establishing natural, contextual, and symbiotic 
relations. This analysis would shed new light on the astounding similarities between 
liberalism’s self-destructive shift from action to behavior, and what van Wolferen has 
described as the “active suppression of the personal inclinations of the Japanese, in nearly 
all social contexts and on all levels, through a program of character-molding that helps 
ensure predictable and disciplined behavior”. VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at 245. Yet 
this is not the right place in which to embark upon a comparison of this kind, which 
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However, two elements appear to be of pivotal importance to the 
scope of our inquiry: (1) the Western façade placed over Japan’s political 
and juridical institutions as expressed by both the Meiji and post-war 
liberal constitutions and recent structural reforms; and (2) the essence of 
“output” mechanisms of political legitimation and accountability through 
which Japan is governed and which appear to share important features 
with Western soft-networked schemes of post-national governance 
(“PNG”).  
II. AUTHORITY AND POWER, REVISITED 
The confusion generated by the Western façade draped over the 
inner, esoteric political essence of Japan’s regulatory apparatus is strictly 
connected to the authority and power dichotomy which informs the 
Western metaphysical tradition. This antithesis was inherited by politico-
theological thought and transplanted into the legal, in particular positivist, 
domain.44   
The antithesis between auctoritas and potestas constitutes the 
pillar of Arendt’s thought on the dissolution of the Western politico-
philosophical tradition.45 Taking this one step farther, Agamben spoke 
instead of “transcendence/immanence, general providence/special 
providence (or fate), first causes/second causes, eternity/temporality, 
intellectual knowledge/praxis”.46 This allowed Agamben to demonstrate 
that since the fall of the Greek polis, the paradoxes, if not the perils, of 
Western politics have been nothing but the expression of the 
aforementioned “politico-juridical” and “economic-governmental” 
rationalities. Importantly, Agamben has also proved that by transposing 
the Pauline concept of the “economy of the mystery” into the “mystery of 
the economy,” the Church’s founding Fathers have made the (theological) 
                                                                                                                         
would require an anthropological and psycho-cultural-sociological pattern of 
investigation capable of explaining why Japanese society is in fact more vital, pragmatic, 
self-oriented, factional, and “disharmonious” than it might seem. Among the promoters of 
the harmonious thesis, see generally YOSHIO SUGIMOTO, AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE 
SOCIETY (Cambridge U. Press 2010); HITOSHI ABE, MUNEYUKI SHINDŌ & SADAFUMI 
KAWATO, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF JAPAN 210 (U. of Tokyo Press 1994); 
RUTH BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF JAPANESE 
CULTURE (Houghton Mifflin 1946); BRADLEY M. RICHARDSON, JAPANESE DEMOCRACY: 
POWER, COORDINATION AND PERFORMANCE 3, 6, 7, 8, 241, 254 (Yale U. Press 1997). 
44 Thus, auctoritas, creatio, ordinatio, dignitas, ousia, gloria, being, substance, and 
legitimacy figure on the one hand, while potestas, conservatio, executio, administratio, 
dynamis, gubernatio, acting, praxis, and legality figure on the other.  
45 ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE, supra note 32, at 120–41. See also HANNAH 
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION, supra note 32, at 171–206. 
46 AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY, supra note 32, at 141. 
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non-epistemic “economic-managerial” paradigm the key component of the 
Western form of civilization. 47 
Building on Peterson contra Schmitt while delving into the 
emptying essence of this strategy,48 Agamben has further maintained that 
the modern liberal nation-state inherits the same logic of the Trinitarian 
paradigm of the oikonomia as “activity of administration and 
management.”49 Liberalism falls exactly within this phenomenon, 
embraces it, and pushes it farther by displacing value-oriented authority in 
favor of value-neutral power.50 Agamben thus argues that in a 
dehumanized post-political age such as ours, in which “popular 
sovereignty [is] an expression drained of all meaning,”51 instead of 
claiming that “there is nothing outside the law” we should rather 
appreciate that “there is nothing inside the law.”52  
Since the feudal age, Japan’s regulatory structure has been 
characterized by the same division between authority and power, which is 
why Kantorowics’s study on the king’s two bodies has a much older 
Japanese counterpart in Suematsu Kenchō’s 1881 investigation of the 
ruler’s physical body (shintai) and spirit (seishin).53 As described by 
Maruyama, this dualistic conception influenced the Yamato dynasty’s 
import from the Chinese centralized bureaucracy of the Tang dynasty of 
the distinction between legitimacy and actual political power.54 The 
                                                 
47 See generally AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY, supra note 32. 
48 In Agamben’s words, “[t]he liturgical praxis of the Church [is defined by] the 
independence of the objective effectiveness and validity of the sacrament from the 
subject who concretely administers it.” See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, OPUS DEI: AN 
ARCHAEOLOGY OF DUTY 21 (Adam Kotso trans., Stan. U. Press 2013) (2012). See 
generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE HIGHEST POVERTY: MONASTIC RULES AND FORM-OF-
LIFE (Adam Kotso trans., Stan. U. Press 2013) (2011). 
49 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE TIME THAT REMAINS: A COMMENTARY TO THE LETTERS TO 
THE ROMANS (Patricia Daily trans. Stan. U. Press 2005) (2000); Agamben, Introductory 
Note on the Concept of Democracy, supra note 33. 
50 AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY, supra note 32, at 284–5.  
51 AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY, supra note 32, at 4.   
52 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, The Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in Walter 
Benjamin, POTENTIALITIES: COLLECTED ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY 170 (Daniel Heller-
Roazen ed. trans., Stan. U. Press 1999). “The entire planet,” Agamben further maintains, 
“has now become the exception that law must contain in its ban.” See generally GIORGIO 
AGAMBEN, MEANS WITHOUT END: NOTES ON POLITICS 113 (Vincenzo Binetti & Cesare 
Casarino trans., U. of Minn. Press 2000).  
53 TAKASHI FUJITANI, SPLENDID MONARCHY: POWER AND PAGEANTRY IN MODERN JAPAN 
155–94 (U.C. Press 1996). 
54 Masao Maruyama, The Structure of Matsurigoto: The Basso Ostinato of Japanese 
Political Life, THEMES AND THEORIES IN MODERN JAPANESE HISTORY: ESSAYS IN 
MEMORY OF RICHARD STORY 27, 38 (Sue Henny & Jean-Pierre Lehmann eds., Athlone 
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Japanese institutionalization of this antithesis was characterized by the 
creation of an ad hoc council, the dajōkan, “council of great 
government,”55 placed between the Emperor and his ministers. Such a 
dichotomy was then officialized by both the Meiji and post-war liberal 
Constitutions which placed the official locus of sovereignty in the 
Emperor and the Diet. The actual exercise of political power was the 
official and unofficial prerogative of other actors.  
If anything, this confirms that any attempt to understand why 
sovereign power in Japan is still grounded in authoritarian instances, 
requires one to delve into the juridical foundation and manifestation of 
authority and power relations within the Japanese context. To be 
successful, this task ought to commence from the analysis of the 
bureaucracy’s predominance over the government and parliament. Among 
others, peculiar attention should be paid to Kaplan’s and Pempel’s 
innovative studies, Johnson’s famous notion of Japan as a “development 
and plan-rational state”, and van Wolferen’s well-known controversial 
claims.56 
In particular, refusing to describe it as a “state,” van Wolferen 
interpreted Japan as a wholly “politicized System” enigmatically run by 
administrators.”57 Van Wolferen also hooked the technocrats’ vision of 
their socio-political function to the Tokugawa rulers’ altruistic belief in the 
need “to sustain the natural order.”58 The Meiji oligarchs thought similarly, 
although they were moved by clearly political aims.59 To the contrary, 
Johnson explicitly addressed the Japanese conception of the “authority-
power” antithesis in light of a primary discrepancy, namely that between 
the visible and outer (omote) and the invisible and inner (ura), or principle 
and formality (tatemae) as distinguished from reality and actual practice 
(honne). Over the past decades, this structural feature has been examined 
from different standpoints such as the tension between the bureaucracy 
and the zaibatsu (business conglomerates), the dynamics through which 
political and administrative elites have interacted with each other, and the 
                                                                                                                         
Press 1988). See id. at 28. 
55 Maruyama, The Structure of Matsurigoto, supra note 54, at 38. 
56 See generally EUGENE J. KAPLAN, JAPAN: THE GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 
(U.S. Bureau of Int’l. Com. 1972); T.J. Pempel, The Bureaucratization of Policymaking 
in Postwar Japan, 18 AM. J. POL. SC. 647 (1974). 
57 VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at 109. Van Wolferen seems, however, to contradict 
himself. Id. at 374. 
58 VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at 304. 
59 VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at 304–5. 
16 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal Vol. 18:1 
 
similarities between pre-war imperial officials (tennō no kanri) and post-
war national bureaucrats (kokka kōmuin).60 
For our purposes, it should be noted that to a certain extent, the 
correct understanding of the “omote-ura” dichotomy may also prove to be 
essential to contextualize Takeyoshi Kawashima’s scholarship on law’s 
development in Japan. The reason being that Kawashima offered 
invaluable accounts on the importance of informal, unofficial, and 
alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution, and on the inevitability of 
the normalization of Japan’s societal relations brought about by its 
Westernization.61 
Here is where the comparatist’s confusion may arise. When 
delving into the role that the Western “authority-power” working logic has 
had in our animalization, Agamben condemned the “angels”—that is, the 
regulatory apparatus as such—and then argued that only the Pauline 
Messianic redemption may save mankind.62 The point, however, is that 
despite what may be thought, Japan represents the anti-canon of the 
Western conception for two specific reasons. 
First, the enactment of the 1947 liberal Constitution has not caused 
the voiding of authority.63 This explains why, while discussing 
                                                 
60 Robert M. Spaulding, The Bureaucracy as a Political Force, 1920–45, DILEMMAS OF 
GROWTH IN PREWAR JAPAN 33–80 (James W. Morley ed., Princeton U. Press 1971); see 
also GORDON, supra note 18, at 82–83, 248, 294–5. For a comparison of the post-war 
bureaucracy with the Tokugawa period’s way of the warrior (Bushido), see generally 
B.C. KOH, JAPAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE (U.C. Press 1989); Atsuyuki Suzuta, The Way 
of the Bureaucrat, 5 JAPAN ECHO 42 (1978). 
61 Kawashima’s first English-language work appeared in Von Mehren’s 1963 edited 
collection of essays. See Foote, LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 7, at xi-xvi.  Notwithstanding 
the use of little empirical data in his comparative research, Kawashima’s suggestions are 
at the center of an important branch of literature that tries to overcome the limits of 
culture-oriented approaches to Japan’s legal development by reference to its 
“institutionalization.” See Masayuki Murayama, Culture, Situation, and Behavior, THE 
CHANGING ROLE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 7, at 189–205; Ichiro Ozaki, Law, Culture 
and Society in Modernizing Japan, THE CHANGING ROLE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 7, 
at 50-65.  
62 See generally AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY, supra note 32; Agamben, 
Introductory Note on the Concept of Democracy, supra note 32. 
63 When analyzing why the 1947 Imperial House Law led “some scholars to argue 
that . . . Japan had an unwritten constitution . . . prior to the Constitution of Japan,” Bix 
noted that “[a]t the deepest levels of national identity emperorism retained its hold over 
the minds of many Japanese.” See BIX, supra note 9, at 578. Compare JOHN DOWER, 
EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 313–18 (Norton 2000) (On 
Emperor Hirohito’s “renovationist” strategy), with KENNETH J. RUOFF, THE PEOPLE’S 
EMPEROR: DEMOCRACY AND THE JAPANESE MONARCHY 86 (Harv. U. Asia Ctr. 2001) 
(“the interpretation that the postwar symbolic monarchy represents a return to premodern 
tradition… is… problematic for several reasons”). See also David S. Law, The Myth of 
the Imposed Constitution in Japan, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONS 239–67 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., Cambridge U. Press 
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MacArthur’s willingness to preserve the Emperor as the canon of Japanese 
socio-political consciousness, McCormack wrote that “the most vociferous 
proponents of the ‘Japanese’ tradition are those most faithful to the US 
order.”64 Thus, as the “benevolence” that informs the settings of the 
Japanese order is truly authoritarian. As a result, while in the West, the 
formal de-politicization and de-juridification of law’s authoritarian 
instances seem to have reached its apex, socio-legal scholars witness the 
opposite trend with respect to Japan, where there is an increase of law’s 
institutionalization.65 
Secondly, if to Western eyes Japan’s enigma or paradox66 is 
represented by the socio-political essence of its “power,” rather than 
“authority,” this is not because “[p]ower in Japan is so diffuse that it 
eludes confrontation.”67 Rather, I contend, it is because the country’s 
“angels”, or guardians, have always exercised political, rather than 
administrative functions, and in so doing, have challenged the very 
essence of the Western paradigm.68 To support this claim from a semantic 
point of view, it would suffice to point to the Japanese title for the imperial 
institution, Tennō Heika, which literally means “heavenly sovereign” a 
conception which exempts the emperor from any political activity as such. 
From a historical perspective, and looking at modern developments only, 
one could point instead to the strategy pursued by the Meiji oligarchs to 
limit party politics, in particular, the Emperor and Diet’s space of 
intervention.69 The fact that this was done for political purposes is beyond 
dispute among Japan’s socio-political theorists and legal historians.70  
                                                                                                                         
2015). 
64 MCCORMACK, CLIENT STATE, supra note 9, at 153.    
65 See generally supra notes 5–7.  
66 See generally HALEY, supra note 40, at 14; VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 19 where it is 
argued that the stability of the Japanese system is due to the combination of centralized 
authority and power diffusion. 
67 VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at 52. 
68 The term “angels” should be understood in its literal meaning, being amakudari 
(descent from heaven), one of the most significant practices in Japan. According to this 
custom, which still operates today, retiring senior technocrats are given prestigious 
sinecures at the companies they supervised and are favored when in office. From a socio-
political and anthropological perspective, it would be worthwhile to compare Van 
Wolferen’s description of the politicization of the household during the Togukawa period 
to Agamben’s study on how the stasis represented in Ancient Greece "a zone of 
indifference between the unpolitical space of the family and the political space of the 
city.” See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STASIS: CIVIL WAR AS A POLITICAL PARADIGM 16 
(Nicholas Heron trans. Stan. U. Press 2015); VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at 165–66. 
69 See RUOFF, supra note 63, at 19, where (I believe not coincidentally) the term 
“authority” is used to describe both the legitimizing source of the Meiji oligarchs’ 
decision-making activity and the essence of the modern imperial institution. See also 
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Yet a similar claim may be made about contemporary Japan as 
well. The term “authority” is not-coincidentally used to describe the 
government’s ruling activity, rather than the Emperor’s legitimizing 
source, in the JSRC’s Recommendations as if, paraphrasing Arendt, 
authority had not vanished in Japan.71This is so despite the conventional 
presentations offered by the transplant of Western values and doctrines 
into the Japanese order and the fact that the term “nation-state” has been 
used by Western72 and Japanese scholars alike.73 The risk inherent in this 
conceptualization is thus to assign to Japanese liberalism the same 
function liberalism has had in the Western tradition,74 as emerges when 
even those commentators who correctly label that of Japan as 
“nonliberalism” speak of a nation-state.75  
This is of pivotal importance, as the sentiment that inspires the 
kazoku kokka ideology “of blood relatives headed by the sovereign 
emperor”76 is the canon of the kokutai. To avoid confusion regarding the 
similarities and differences between the Japanese and Western paradigms 
of “nation-state,” particular attention should therefore be paid to Arendt 
and MacPherson’s accounts on the Hobbesian device.77 In particular, 
                                                                                                                         
DOWER, supra note 63, at 379, 602. This may also shed new light on why the premise of 
the Authentic Account of the Shōwa Emperor’s Life and Reign (Shōwa Tenno Jitsuroku) 
released by the Imperial House in 2014 is that the emperor is a “non-political” figure. See 
Herbert P. Bix, Showa History, Rising Nationalism, and the Abe Government, 13 ASIA-
PAC. J. (Jan. 2015), http://apjjf.org/-Herbert-P--Bix/4251/article.pdf. The distinction 
between the kokutai, which stands above politics, is represented by the Emperor, and 
embraces the “national structure”, and the seitai, or “political structure”, is rooted in this 
conception. See Eisenstadt, supra note 36, at 31 (quoting Peter Duus). 
70 See EISENSTADT, JAPANESE CIVILIZATION, supra note 36, at 37; GORDON, A MODERN 
HISTORY OF JAPAN, supra note 18, at 62.  
71 See generally ARENDT, supra note 32. 
72 RUOFF, supra note 63, at 1; JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 25. 
73 Such as Hozumi Yatsuka, who spoke of “nation-state as family”—kazoku kokka. See 
McVeigh, supra note 2, at 43-44. 
74 See SHARON NOLTE, LIBERALISM IN MODERN JAPAN: ISHIBASHI AND HIS TEACHERS. 
1905–1960 (U.C. Press 1987); see also ABE, SHINDŌ, AND KAWATO, supra note 43, at 
207. 
75 Wolfgang Streeck, Introduction, THE ORIGINS OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM: GERMANY 
AND JAPAN IN COMPARISON 1–38, 24 (Wolfgang Streeck & Koko Yamamura eds., Cornell 
Univ. Press 2001). 
76 RUOFF, supra note 63, at 27. See RICHARD MITCHELL, CENSORSHIP IN IMPERIAL JAPAN 
55 (Princeton U. Press 1983). 
77 See generally CB MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE 
INDIVIDUALISM (Oxford University Press, 1962); ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION, 
supra note 32, at 299–300. 
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according to Arendt, the artificial birth of the Leviathan was based “not on 
some kind of constituting law . . . which determines the rights and wrongs 
of the individual’s interest with respect to public affairs, but on the 
individual interests themselves.”78 If this is correct, the reason for Japan 
not being affected by liberalism’s administrative logic is purely historical. 
Although the Meiji leaders had engineered nationalism,79 they “did not 
create a liberal state and society.”80 
Thus, it is historical institutionalism that proves that the Japanese 
nation (nihon minzoku) is not, and has never been, a nation-state, at least 
in the Western sense of the term.81 To argue otherwise by unduly 
highlighting the Japanese belief in the inherent goodness of ever-
increasing prosperity, science, and “techno-logical” advances, or 
MacArthur’s faith in the Christian “spiritual core” of democracy, would be 
misleading. The functional formation of the Japanese state’s myth82 is 
neither the expression of Hobbes’s passion for geometry and reason-
oriented behavioral standards,83 nor the Platonic and Stoic metaphysical 
conceptions, both of which constitute the seed of the modern branch of the 
Western politico-theological tradition.84  
Yet this leads to a corollary consideration. Political and legal 
theorists, as well as sociologists and philosophers, are aware of the 
imperativeness of the challenge brought about by the global governance 
model of the liberal-corporate lex mercatoria. Thus, Wendy Brown asks, 
“What can democratic rule mean if the economy is unharnessed by the 
                                                 
78 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 139 (Harvest 1973) (1951). 
79 Kokumin, meaning “people,” “nation,” “a national,” “a citizen,” became an extremely 
popular term by the early twentieth century. Any attempt to understand Japanese 
nationalism should at least consider the works of Maruyama Masao. See SASAKI, supra 
note 36; Andrew E. Barshay, Imagining Democracy in Postwar Japan: Reflections on 
Maruyama Masao and Modernism, 18(2) J. JAP. STUDIES 365 (1992). See infra the 
concluding remarks to this paper. 
80 NOLTE, supra note 74, at 4. 
81 The fact that Yamamuro uses the term “nation-state” in conjunction with “national 
empire” (kokumin teikoku) gives further support to this thesis. See Shinichi Yamamuro,  
Form and Function of the Meiji State in Modern East Asia, 34(1) ZINBUN 179 (1999). 
82 MCCORMACK, THE EMPTINESS OF JAPANESE AFFLUENCE, supra note 9, at 176. See also 
RUOFF, supra note 63, at 17. 
83 Among others, see ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 146 (Yale Univ. Press, 
1974) (1946). This is why, to make sense of the Japanese paradigm, McVeigh combines 
rationality with ceremonial rituality, in MCVEIGH, THE NATURE OF THE JAPANESE STATE. 
RATIONALITY AND RITUALITY (Routledge, 1998). What Eisenstadt defined as the “lack of 
universalistic components [in the] definition[n] of Japanese collectivity” should be 
analyzed from this perspective. See EISENSTADT, supra note 36, at 284. 
84 Which is why Katō Hiroyuki feared that Christianity would empty the kokutai. See 
MCVEIGH, supra note 2, at 44. 
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political yet dominates it?”85 This question could be rightly asked about 
Japan as well, considering that the spark for the political paradigm through 
which Japan has been ruled for almost 40 years in the post-war period was 
the merger of the Liberal Party and Democratic Party, organized by 
financial, trade, and industrial organizations. Thus, Eisenstadt writes that 
“the combination of a nonideological, accommodative stance with an 
emphasis on consensual politics . . . has characterized the LDP from the 
very beginning.”86 
The structural symbiosis between Japanese rulers and businesses, 
as well as the confusion that Davis’s description of the Meiji Restoration 
as an act of “civic theology” are well-known. 87 However, what matters for 
our comparative purposes is that Japan’s “angels” are not Hobbes’s “civil 
magistrate” whose main concern, in Pocock’s words, was “the whole 
content of revealed religion.” 88 By “religion” we mean the juridico-
political deditio in fidem which in Greek and Roman times linked the city 
and the people together. The term “concern” indicates instead the 
theoretical premise for the practical voiding that the liberal “(non-
)sovereign”, as mere civil magistrate, performs on the public-religious 
bond, with the intent to let civil society’s capitalist (and, thus, scientific) 
interests dissolve the act of political government.89 
This understanding may shed new light on Curtis’s attempt to 
uncover the limits of Johnson’s plan-rational “developmental state” 
theory, as well as of all those accounts according to which the Japanese 
“miracle” was obtained by the triple-featured system of LDP’s one-party 
democratic system, the bureaucracy, and big businesses known as “Japan, 
Inc.” Curtis’s contention is based upon what he had claimed eleven years 
earlier.90 In particular, after having noted that “[p]olitics in Japan makes 
sense in Japanese terms”91 in a manner that recalls Legrand’s argument on 
the practical impossibility of legal transplants,92 Curtis argued that both 
                                                 
85 WENDY BROWN, We Are All Democrats Now . . ., DEMOCRACY IN WHAT STATE?, supra 
note 32, at 44, 54. 
86 EISENSTADT, supra note 36, at 155. 
87 Watson Davis, The Civil Theology of Inoue Tetsujirō, 3(1) JAP. J. REL. STUDIES 5 
(1976). See MCVEIGH, supra note 2, at 67 and 152–54. 
88 See generally JOHN G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON 
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 166 (U. of Chi Press 1989) (1971). 
89 Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Reflections on the Pactum in the Liberal Global “Eden,” THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF CONTRACT LAW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE – VOL I 
(Luca Siliquini-Cinelli & Andrew Hutchison eds., Springer forthcoming 2017). 
90 CURTIS, THE JAPANESE WAY OF POLITICS, supra note 9, at xi. 
91 CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS, supra note 9, at 10. 
92 Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & 
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“[t]he theory of politician dominance [and] the theory of bureaucratic 
dominance [are] curiously apolitical”93 because neither is capable of 
encompassing the fact Japan “is not a corporatist system.”94 Rather, in the 
Japanese model, politics and bureaucracy form what could described as an 
inextricable, substantial, and functional partnership whose essence is 
purely political.95 It is indeed the LDP’s “[s]trong political leadership 
[that] defines the parameters of feasible government policy and gives 
bureaucrats the political opportunity to try to pursue their own preferences 
within those boundaries”.96 The same may be said with respect to the 
scenario inaugurated with the 1994 electoral reforms. These were expected 
to break up the LDP’s dominance and generate a two-party system. 
However, what has resulted from them is, in Curtis’s words, “quite the 
opposite of what its proponents said the new system would accomplish.”97  
Other scholars, such as Inoguchi, Park, Richardson, Miwa, 
Ramseyer, Nakazato, and more recently Kazuyuki, have made similar 
suggestions that may be used to support the claim that Japanese society is 
politically governed rather than managerially administered.98 Further 
elements in support of this argument may be seen in Schlesinger’s 
argument against the “Japan, Inc.” label through the deconstruction of 
                                                                                                                         
COMP. L. 111 (1997); see also Pierre Legrand, What ”Legal Transplants?“, ADAPTING 
LEGAL CULTURES 55–69 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., Hart Pub. 2001). 
93 CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS, supra note 9, at 59. 
94 CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS, supra note 9, at 60; see also VAN 
WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at 81. 
95 CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS, supra note 9, at 59 and 61; see VAN 
WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at 143. Finally, see KOH, supra note 60, at 264, according to 
whom: 
“The character of the nexus between bureaucrats and politicians can 
also be listed as a strength of the Japanese model. The modes of 
interaction between the two groups, the bureaucratization of politics, 
and the politicization of bureaucracy in Japan result in in an unusually 
high degree of cooperation between them, which can construed as 
functional not only for the government bureaucracy but for the larger 
society as well”.  
96 CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS, supra note 9, at 62. Emphasis added. 
97 CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS, supra note 9, at 138. 
98 TAKASHI INOGUCHI, ESSAYS IN JAPAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 188–89 (U. of Tokyo 
Press 1983); YOSHIRŌ MIWA & MARK RAMSEYER, THE FABLE OF THE KEIRETSU: URBAN 
LEGENDS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY (U. of Chi. Press 2006); YUNG H. PARK, 
BUREAUCRATS AND MINISTERS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE GOVERNMENT (U.C. Press 
1986); see BRIAN J. MCVEIGH, THE STATE BEARING GIFTS: DECEPTION AND 
DISSATISFACTION IN JAPANESE HIGHER EDUCATION 9–10 (Lexington 2010) (2006) (where 
Japan is described as a “managerial state” and yet “political renovationist nationalism” is 
used to avoid the amalgamation between Japan and “Anglo-American liberalism”). 
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Tanaka’s, Kanemaru Shin’s, Takeshita Noboru’s, and Ozawa’s “political 
machine”, as well as in Baruma’s suggestions that the post-war order, in 
which the “LDP System [was] a formidable political machine . . .  is still 
intact”, and Murphy’s belief that “the political is everywhere in Japan”.99 
III. “OUTPUT” FORMS OF GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENT 
Another element that may complicate the legal comparatist’s 
interpretation of Japan’s relationship with the liberal global-order project 
is the way in which political theorists such as Richardson or jurists such as 
Itoh, Haley, Wolff, Nottage, and Anderson use the terms “government” 
and “governance” interchangeably in their work As they do so, the 
distinction between governance’s administrative essence and 
government’s political one is blurred. As a result, it becomes almost 
impossible to compare Japan’s much-debated peculiar theoretical-cultural 
conceptions of political, juridical, and social accountability with the 
movement from “input” to “output” forms of “(non-)legitimation” and 
“(non-)accountability” that has taken place in the West since the end of the 
“bipolar” age.100 What I shall argue in this section offers a systematization 
and neorealist contextualization of the “government-governance” 
dichotomy with the aim of contributing to the academic debate on the 
subject. 
Writing in 1989, van Wolferen argued that “[i]n Western 
constitutional democracies the problem of legitimacy does not arise, 
because citizens have recourse to corrective mechanisms whenever the 
procedures preceding political decisions diverge consistently from a 
legally sanctioned course”. To the contrary, van Wolferen further 
maintained, “[i]n Japan . . . laws do not control the administrators but are 
tools for administrative control”.101 This is why van Wolferen opened his 
magnum opus on the “enigmatic” essence of Japanese power by discussing 
the “fiction of responsible central government”, that is, the belief 
according to which Japan is a “state with central organs of government 
that can both recognize what is good for the country and bear ultimate 
responsibility for national decision-making”.102 This is not surprising, as 
the “occult” aim of Hirohito’s 1946 Declaration of Humanity was to 
                                                 
99 Compare BURUMA, supra note 9, at 169; MURPHY, supra note 9, at 267; with 
Maruyama, Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism, THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOUR IN 
MODERN JAPANESE POLITICS 1, 2 (Ivan Morris ed., Oxford U. Press 1963) (1946) (1946 
warning about Japan’s “low level of political consciousness”); and with McVeigh supra 
note 2, at 264–65 (recent account on Japanese “political apathy”). 
100 Siliquini-Cinelli, Hayek the Schmittian, supra note 10. 
101 VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at 310. 
102 VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 9, at 3; See generally MURPHY, supra note 9. 
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restore the kokutai by limiting, rather than promoting, the democratization 
of the country.103 
The landscape has changed both in the West and Japan since then. 
In the former there have emerged liquid, soft-networked schemes of PNG, 
that is, value-free mechanisms of regulation that transcend state-based 
patterns of government by working according to what elsewhere I have 
defined as output schemes of “(non-)legitimation” and “(non-
)accountability.”104 If, building on Foucault, Agamben contended that 
today’s “politics assume[s] . . . the form of an oikonomia, that is, of a 
governance of empty speech over bare life,”105 it is because modernity has 
shown that the subjects of biopolitics are continuously exposed to legal 
and political violence by the ruler and no one can be held responsible for 
it. 
In this respect, by substituting the ante-factum paradigm with its 
post-factum counterpart, inter-connected systems of PNG have proved to 
be essential for the liberal technē oikonomikē (literally, “economic 
technique”) to empty sovereignty and displace authority from view in 
Arendtian and Agambenian terms. This is so because the liberal logic 
which informs PNG’s workings displaces the irreducibility of any 
foundational political initiative by annihilating the boundlessness and 
unpredictability of (political) action. As discussed earlier, this is done 
through the promotion of dehumanizing, reason-oriented schemes of 
societal interaction.106 Importantly, while this phenomenon lies at the core 
of the artificial formation of the liberal nation-state, it was then pushed 
farther by the strategy pursued by the post-war universalization of liberal 
thought. The indifference towards man qua man’s original, irreducible, 
                                                 
103 On this, and on Hirohito’s admission that democracy had been adopted not because 
the people were sovereign but “because [democracy] was the will of the Meiji emperor,” 
see BIX, supra note 9, at 562. 
104 Siliquini-Cinelli, “Against Interpretation”?, supra note 10; see generally BEYOND 
TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
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and Change in World Politics, GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 104, at 
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unpredictable, and self-determining action is indeed incompatible with the 
essence of the public realm properly understood.107  
On the contrary, with respect to Japan, it seems that Maruyama’s 
contention that “there is a close relationship between the expressions of 
power and the scale of values accepted by those over whom it is 
exercised,”108 as well as Kawashima’s prediction on the increasing 
relevance of legalization and judicialization, and Upham’s sentiment on 
the incorrectness of law’s insignificance, have all proved to be 
appropriate.109 Indeed, over the last two decades Japan has embarked upon 
an “institutionalizing” and democracy-informed developmental path. As a 
result, civic engagement in the production of law and assimilation of 
normative instances has been promoted through public participation in 
formal legal processes.  
The sentiment underlying these reforms appears diametrically 
opposed to that which informed Aizawa Seishisai’s 1825 Shinron (New 
Theses), which popularized the concept of kokutai by affirming that 
society should just accept the ruler’s benevolence and never know what 
the actual rules are. Aizawa’s Theses played a major role in the restorative 
roadmap pursued by the Meiji rulers through the enactment of the Meiji 
Constitution in 1889.110 
In fact, several normative interventions could be listed to support 
the argument that Japan has moved from what in pre-war times was 
known as hōka banno, including, the omnipotence of law as embodied by 
the dominance of the University of Tokyo’s law graduates within the 
bureaucracy111 to the Western-oriented politico-legal model. In addition to 
the 1994 electoral reform and the JSRC’s 2001 Recommendations, 
innumerable other initiatives may be listed when addressing this period of 
great reform (dai henkaku-ki).112  
                                                 
107 ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 32, at 178, and 200–1. 
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As mentioned, there has been the tendency in the recent literature 
to offer a socio-legal contextualization of this law-oriented trend with the 
aim of overcoming the limits of a merely cultural approach to Japan’s 
legal progress.113 The argument usually put forward is that all modernizing 
interventions were (and still are) specifically conceived to provide a 
tangible sign of Japan’s movement from a “rule by man” to a “rule of law” 
liberal order by enhancing the political and juridical responsiveness of its 
public institutions. This contention is, in fact, sound and the relatively low 
(yet rapidly increasing) litigation rate or small number of lawyers that still 
characterize the Japanese scenario in comparison to that of the US and the 
European Union should not be used to argue otherwise. What Japan’s 
legal reforms seem to signify is indeed the political intent to move from 
the Meiji oligarchy’s “occasional accommodation of the public wishes”114 
to a fully, and thus not “pseudo,”115 democratic scheme of legitimation and 
accountability.  
Yet, I submit, the impact of these “transparency” and 
“accountability” transformations, as well as the normativization trend 
generally, ought to be appreciated in light of the Japanese system’s 
peculiar capacity to combine politico-juridical change with stability. 
Caution is thus required, as historically, the development of Japan’s 
politico-juridical consciousness has always been characterized by the 
continuous creation, destruction, and “restorative” reconstruction of 
networks and areas of intervention for instrumentalist purposes. 
Furthermore, renovationist nationalism has been a key component of 
Japan’s development since the Meiji period.116  
The above-listed reforms, I contend, are not extraneous to this 
“constant condition”117 as they have impacted more on the existence, 
rather than essence, and thus on the modality rather than substance, of 
politico-institutional formations, reconfigurations, and performances. 
More precisely, taking what has been argued by Takayuki Ii one step 
farther,118 I would suggest that what they have led to is a zone of 
                                                                                                                         
JAPAN  265–76 (Jeff Kingston ed., Routledge 2014). 
113 See supra note 61, regarding the influence of Kawashima’s scholarship on the 
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intersection between Japan’s “mediatory universe”.119 This “universe” is 
characterized by historic inter-connected levels of dynamic interaction and 
access to information schemes as well as the centralized, top-down 
mechanisms that have always underpinned the loyal, culture-oriented 
cohesiveness of the Japanese in regards to their construction of systems of 
supervision and regulation.  
If we are to analytically uncover the inner functioning of this 
double-featured scheme in light of Japan’s recent legal innovations, we 
need to overcome the limits of the debate on the importance of choosing 
between a merely cultural or socio-legal approach to Japan’s 
normativization. Rather, we need to for an inter-disciplinary tertium 
comparationis that combines the strengths of both, as well as that of other 
subjects such as anthropology and political science.120 In doing so, it will 
become clear that, contrary to what has occurred in the West, methods of 
output recognition are used to express, rather than drain, the concept of 
the political and provide it with a “tangible” platform of visibility in 
Japan.121 If anything, the intent of the JSRC’s 2001 Recommendations to 
enhance popular sovereignty by (also) “shift[ing] from ex ante regulation 
by public authorities to ex post relief through the judicial system” and 
promoting the “rhetoric of improved legal capacity and greater popular 
participation in the law”122 is testament to this. 
Clearly, for politico-juridical legitimation to occur, its output must 
be visible and discernible.123 Hence the responsiveness and adaptability of 
networks at the macro, meso, and micro levels increase social involvement 
and produce, as Ikeda and Richy have recently expounded, “political 
knowledge.”124 This analytical view is in line with Okimoto’s well-known 
description of Japan as a “networked” or “societal” state in which 
“[p]olitical power . . . is . . . exercised through a complex process of 
public-private sector interaction, involving subtle give-and-take, not 
frontal confrontations.”125 
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Furthermore, such an understanding seems to be in line with the 
pluralist “horizontal-fragmented metaphor”126 that Richardson used when 
describing how Japanese politics is a “matrix of high-level, middle-level, 
and low-level decisions”.127 In his words, “[t]here are many decision 
points and many channels through which popular concerns can be 
expressed and the government made accountable.”128 The workings of 
such mechanisms, and in particular the “existence of a coordination-
integration dynamic in [Japanese] politics,”129 fall perfectly within the 
relational and compromise-oriented “gift-giving” modus operandi upon 
which, as McVeigh has persuasively demonstrated,130 Japanese state-
society relations depend, and which also informed the enactment of the 
1947 Constitution.131 Thus, paraphrasing McVeigh, we may say that 
output systems of politico-juridical validation also act as “historical 
constructions” that make it possible for the Japanese to be “statists.”132 
Importantly, the workings of Japan’s power relations demonstrate 
that it cannot be inferred from the “fiduciary” essence of this bargaining 
relationship that counter mechanisms of practical politico-juridical 
supervision are not required. On the contrary, the whole system would 
have collapsed long ago without them. Richardson summarizes this well 
when writing that while the Japanese “government is responsible to the 
electorate and its interest groups, . . . responsibility comes most often in 
fragmented, decentralized bargains and less often by way of programs.”133 
The failing experience of the first Democratic Party of Japan’s 
premiership, that of Hatoyama Yukio in 2009, brought to an end because 
of the government’s inability to keep the promises of change and deliver 
to the voters the reforms they asked for, supports Richardson’s assertion. 
The same may be said about the working logic of Japan’s bureaucratic 
branches.134  
The anthropological and socio-political essence of this 
“bargaining” attitude has been much debated, especially in regard to the 
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well-known mutual back-scratching deals (jinmyaku) that underpin 
network formations at the upper levels of Japanese society. What is 
relevant to our purpose here is that the view that emphasizes this ‘do ut 
des’ mindset finds a valuable ally in the recent work of Asako, Iida, 
Matsubayashi, and Ueda. By applying their theoretical model to both 
dynastic- and non-dynastic politicians, they found that the former category 
enjoys specific “electoral and bargaining advantages” that “bring more 
distribution to the district” and that, in turn, result in a higher probability 
of getting elected. 135 A similar suggestion was also made by Ono, whose 
empirical analysis led him to claim that the main aim of “legislators with 
local-level political experience is to engage in particularistic pork-barrel 
activities that will benefit their local interests.”136 
The trajectory of these accounts seem to confirm the necessity of 
analyzing the social formations and power configurations that underpin 
Japan’s politico-juridical dimension(s) from a contextual and dynamic 
perspective. 137  In fact, contrary to the Western conception broadly 
understood, in Japan political economic “guidance” (shidô) is “bestowed 
upon society by officialdom”138 and yet structurally informed by the 
output logic of political recognition. Van Wolferen has aptly defined this 
relationship as the “emotional trust”139 of the Japanese toward the 
performative “benevolence” of their government. The fact that 
administrative guidance has been a major target of liberal theorists is thus 
not surprising.140 
What matters, then, is that in the West, output mechanisms of 
“(non-)recognition,” “(non-)legitimacy”, and “(non-)accountability” 
perform a post-political function. Conversely, when it comes to describing 
the Japanese paradigm, the “(non-)” and “post-political” labels ought to be 
dropped, as output schemes have always been a vibrant instrument not just 
for the maintenance of social and economic order by public-policy 
makers, but for the signification of the concept of the political.141 
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While in the West, systems of PNG have officially emerged to 
overcome political blockages through more horizontal concertation and 
less vertical imposition, the need to transcend classic state-based patterns 
of legislation, regulation, and administration has not emerged in Japan, 
where responses to new problems and new risks have been provided 
through ongoing elaboration and reflection on classic practices of 
governing. That the Japanese dimension is characterized by a considerable 
degree of (a paradoxically stable) internal dynamism is proved by 
Japanese rulers’ ability to “use” social networks and power settings to 
provide a solid basis of local support that can be discretionarily used over 
national and international policy issues.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Official presentations and conventional story-telling narratives tell 
us that Japan’s recent legal development has to be inscribed within the 
liberal movement that seeks to reduce the state’s intervention in societal 
affairs.142 Thus, as lawyers, when it comes to addressing Japan’s 
ambiguous relationship with the liberal global-order project, we are 
confronted with both a question of substance and one of method. In 
particular, the former question refers to the essence of the nationalistic 
vision that Japan’s guardians share of their own polity. The latter refers 
instead to the modality through which the neorealist kokutai legitimizes 
and promotes itself in politico-juridical terms. Both questions share a 
common core, as it was the US indirect super-national government that 
reinforced pre-war conceptions of power relations and old ties among the 
conservative elites.143 
The legal comparatist’s insights may be of fundamental assistance 
when embarking upon the delicate enterprise of answering these questions. 
When writing on the “convergence-divergence debate,” Sebastian 
McEvoy has argued that one day “it will be paradoxical to argue against 
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the harmonization and even the unification of the laws around the globe: 
legally, here will be everywhere.”144 If we agree with him and consider the 
involvement of comparative law scholars in the de-politicization and de-
juridification of the world,145 both the official and “occult” aims of the 
comparative method described in the introductory part of this paper may 
shed new light on the use that Japanese legal scholars and institutional 
actors make of the law’s authoritarian claims to oppose liberals’ totalizing 
strategy.146 
Paraphrasing Ozaki, it could then be argued that Japan is not part 
of the liberal global-order project simply because it is experiencing the 
very opposite of the phenomenon that is currently occurring in the West. 
That is, it is “turning from a law-aversive into a law-using society.”147 This 
straightforward use of Japan’s so-called “legal turn” (hōka) is surely sound 
and helps us understand why (the) law is no longer “synonymous with 
pain or penalty,” as put forward by Noda.148 Importantly, such a view 
would reinforce those claims against the risk that, without methodological 
rigor, “comparative law becomes an idle exercise in pseudo-comparative 
sociology.”149 However, positive analysis alone does not provide the 
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Western interpreter with the instruments that s/he needs to appreciate why 
the Japanese order is still characterized by the spatial (Ortung) and 
juridical (Ordnung) components of any legal order targeted by the 
promoters of universalized liberalism.  
This is not to say that attention should not be paid to the normative 
processes that have made (and still make) it possible for law in Japan to 
play a diametrically opposed role to that which “global (non-)law” does in 
emptying the anthropological and socio-political existential function of the 
jurist, and the role that law has in “normalizing” our actions.150 Such an 
analysis is unavoidable. Nonetheless, the increase of local politico-
juridical consciousness and the instrumentalist use made of it by Japanese 
rulers cannot be fully grasped without an unconventional modus 
investigandi that transcends the limits of mere positivist and behavioral 
institution-oriented lines of inquiry.151 In addition to recent findings in 
political science that this paper has discussed, the legal comparatist may 
also count on Benedict’s anthropological account of Japan’s “situational” 
morality,152 Muramaki’s definition of Japanese culture as hermeneutico-
contextual,153 Nottage’s evidence of how sociocultural standards still 
affect Japanese law’s development,154 or Wolff’s discussion of the “socio-
legal and empirical implications of law’s rising influence in Japanese 
popular culture.”155  
In fact, legal comparatists have long been aware of the need to 
adopt “interdisciplinary approaches” to uncover “the multiple dimensions 
of globalization and its effects on local legal traditions.”156 If we apply this 
awareness to the Japanese case, it would emerge that even though, as 
Yoshino points out, “[g]lobalization continues to be on the agenda,”157 the 
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reason for Japan not being part of the post-political liberal order is that it 
has never been, does not constitute, an oikonomia as defined by Agamben. 
The extent to which the well-known linkage between politicians (state) 
and business (civil society) recalls the “marketing” of political candidates 
described by Schumpeter, Hayek, and Schmitt,158 should not confuse 
anyone. What counts is that Cutler’s notion of “mercatocracy,”159 which 
she used to describe the pluralistic influence of the global corporate elite 
over law and regulatory arrangements, would not be apt to describe the 
essence of Japan’s “nonliberal”160 national economy. 
Thus, while in the West, the administrative “de-democratic” 
system brought about by the merging of “corporate and state power”161 
has nullified both authority and sovereignty, in Japan, power is still 
exercised politically and grounded in authoritarian, sovereign, and 
identitarian regulative instances. In other words, while the Western de-
politicization of societal affairs has substituted government with 
governance through what Catá Backer has defined as the suspension of 
“the presumption of an identity between state and government,”162 Japan’s 
regulatory structure is underpinned by the (Japanese) concept of the 
political in every mode in which law’s organizing claims present 
themselves. As a result, the Japanese cannot be defined as “(non-)humans” 
who, in the post-historical age, merely behave according to the mechanical 
and recursive schemes promoted by liberalism. Notwithstanding the use of 
liberal labels and the ambiguity of several socio-economic policies 
designed officially to empower the “company culture,” the above-analyzed 
preconditions for a country to be affected by liberalism’s neutralizing 
dictum have not been fulfilled with respect to Japan. Therefore, Kojève’s 
analysis ought to be preferred over Supiot. 
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This can be further understood if we pause for a moment and 
reflect on why, seventy years ago, Maruyama, who made the fight against 
authoritarian government the canon of his intellectual engagement, quoted 
Schmitt when analyzing the consequences of the “post-Reformation wars” 
and contending that the European (nation-)state “adopt[ed] a neutral 
position on internal values.”163 To the contrary, “Japanese nationalism 
strove consistently to base its control on internal values rather than from 
external laws.”164 As a result, Maruyama further maintained, “the Japanese 
State never came to the point of drawing a distinction between the external 
and internal spheres and of recognizing that its authority was valid only 
for the former.”165 The apparent similarity between Schmitt’s belief that 
the state’s political existence requires the sovereign right of self-defense166 
and Abe’s reintroduction of collective self-defense should not confuse us. 
What matters is that Japanese nationalism is not affected by the liberal and 
positivist schism between juristic heteronomy and moral autonomy 
criticized by Schmitt167 and which has determined the modern 
displacement of the concept of the political in the Western tradition. In this 
sense, the fact that in his 1946 essay Maruyama described the Japanese 
experience as anti-Schmittian reinforces the view that Ogyū Sorai’s 
Chinese-oriented politico-totalistic view has been concretized in the 
Japanese dimension.168 
However, few would doubt that a political shift has occurred since 
McCormack suggested that “[t]he idea of restoring the essential features of 
the 1889 Constitution that was present throughout the Cold War decades” 
had been put aside with the end of the conflict.169 It is equally true that 
Japanese nationalism is “ordinary” in the sense that it has a pluralistic, 
malleable configuration, as is the case with all nationalisms.170 These 
aspects notwithstanding, it seems to me that Japan has rediscovered the 
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state-oriented utilitarian view that, as Tetsuo Najita successfully contended 
in his scholarship, informed the idealism and pragmatism of the Meiji 
period.171 This is why, in his patriotic speech to the US Congress, Abe 
spoke of a “new” Japan which, as Emperor Hirohito declared in the New 
Year’s Day rescript, is such only because it has “rediscovered” what 
rendered it special in the past. In particular, bearing in mind Gellner’s 
argument that it is nationalism that “makes” nations, not the reverse,172 the 
words used by Abe confirm that Japan’s neorealist roadmap is informed 
by frustration with the post-war domination achieved by left-wingers who 
have undermined the sense of national pride (kokumin dōtoku). It is this 
renovationist spirit that proves that the above-listed “Western” reforms 
express more a structural-organizational, rather than substantial-
existential, development toward liberal policies.  
There are both theoretical and practical explanations for this 
renovationist choice. Theoretically, despite the fact that the 1947 
Constitution provides for equality, freedom of expression, and extensive 
rights,173 the belief of Japan’s ruling elite is that, having been 
“contaminated” by US foreign imperialist policies, post-war nationalism 
has always lacked what, Maruyama has defined as Japan’s “mission 
idea.”174 Yet, considering its ideological and practical essence, the kokutai 
needs to present itself within the seitai, or sphere of pragmatic 
government, to perform its regulative instances.175  
With Koizumi and Abe, this combination has assumed the form of 
ideological-conservative political leadership.176 Considering Maruyama’s 
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definition of the kokutai as an “absolute value,”177 it is all the more evident 
that Koizumi’s green lighting of the 2004 intervention in Iraq (in 
contravention of Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution)178 as well as the 
nationalistic reforms listed in the introductory part of this contribution, 
share important structural components with Japan’s pre-war 
nationalism.179 More particularly, Maruyama’s description of that type of 
nationalism may be overlapped with Abe’s willingness to restore the pre-
war fundamentals of “beautiful Japan”.180 Therefore, Maruyama’s 
politico-realist call for national identity via independent thinking 
(shutaisei), democracy, and unarmed neutrality, has been listened to only 
partially.181 
A final comment is in order. The reflections in this article share the 
premise of the innumerable accounts of the process of “Japanization” that 
Japan has always imposed upon imported ways of thought and practices. 
However, the foregoing discussion is only partly compatible with the line 
of reasoning that emphasizes what in comparative scholarship is 
commonly known as “Japanese exceptionalism.” The so-called 
Nihonjinron literature is aimed at affirming the uniqueness of Japanese 
society through a comparison with other forms of civilization. As 
Sugimoto has noted, this quest for authenticity and purity has been 
pursued ad nauseam.182 To propose this approach here would be 
inappropriate and misleading. As discussed, the ultimate goal of the liberal 
global-order project is to create an intangible “(non-)reality” of 
dehumanized objective regularities through the imposition of reason-
oriented uniform mechanisms of societal interaction. This process 
dissolves the presentification of local living sensibilities via definition of 
identities. Thus, any manifestation of sovereign politico-juridical and self-
affirming consciousness, not just that of the Japanese, may be considered 
as an “exception” to the liberal “form-of-(non-)living.”183  
                                                 
177 MARUYAMA, supra note 99, at 6.  
178 The dispute between the lower courts, according to which the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces are unconstitutional, and the higher courts that overruled their judgments is well-
known.  
179 Maruyama, supra note 99, at 144, 153; see also Gavan McCormack, The End of the 
Postwar? The Abe Government, Okinawa, and Yonaguni Island, 12 ASIA-PAC. J. (2014), 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/4233/article.html. 
180 SHINZŌ ABE, TOWARDS A BEAUTIFUL COUNTRY: MY VISION FOR JAPAN (VERTICAL, 
2007). See also MCCORMACK, supra note 179; GAVIN MCCORMACK, Japan: Prime 
Minister Abe Shinzo’s Agenda, 14 ASIA-PAC. J. (2015), 
http://apjjf.org/2016/24/McCormack.html.  
181 Maruyama, supra note 99, at 152; see also Sasaki, supra note 36. 
182 SUGIMOTO, supra note 43, at 4.  
183 Siliquini-Cinelli & Schütte, supra note 29. 
